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For more information contact: Drawing upon the documents in this collection and other material is an article on the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the April issue of International History Review.
The French rejected the comprehensive nuclear safeguards that Washington favored because they “did not want to be accused of acting with nuclear suppliers to gang up on non-NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] parties and even some NPT countries. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has played a significant role in the history of the nonproliferation system since the s, although the concerns raised by the French indicate why it was a controversial project very early on.
The shock created by the Indian “peaceful nuclear explosion” in May raised questions about the safeguarding of sensitive nuclear technology. With growing competition for sales of nuclear reactors and equipment, U. Accordingly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authorized a secret diplomatic process to create a high-level group that would establish criteria for preventing the diversion of sensitive nuclear technology and materials into nuclear weapons production.
The other founding members were governments on both sides of the Cold War line: This summary, excerpted from document 13D, may have been prepared for Secretary Kissinger to give him background and the state-of-play on the discussions with the French on their participation in the suppliers group project. Corresponding French government records on these developments are unavailable. The Treaty stipulated that the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA would provide safeguards for exports of nuclear supplies but it did not create any arrangements for discouraging nuclear exporters from equipping non-nuclear weapons states with sensitive technology.
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Once the NPT had been ratified by many states, large and small, a Swiss academic, Professor Claude Zangger, established a working group of nuclear exporters to develop a trigger list of supplies requiring safeguards.
The Zangger Committee, however, did not include technology in its trigger list. Ford had to resolve. Convincing France to participate in the suppliers group was a central problem; the French had refused to sign the NPT but were becoming more concerned about the spread of nuclear capabilities. Yet, as noted, they were also concerned about appearances — that governments without a nuclear infrastructure would see the suppliers group as a “cartel” designed to keep them down.
Nevertheless, from the U. After the French government had assented, the suppliers group began meeting although it would operate on a “lowest common denominator” basis in order to keep France from being “isolated” on key issue such as full-scope safeguards.
Pre-existing agreements on sensitive cases e. The Nuclear Suppliers Group started out, and remains, an essentially voluntary international organization. From the outset, its guidelines did not have the force of international law and depended on action by the member states to observe and implement them.
Duringthe NSG expanded membership to broaden support for its objectives. Nevertheless, init stopped meeting because of internal differences over the next steps, such as the role of full-scope safeguards. The guidelines, which became public in when the IAEA published them, served as a reference tool for nuclear export policies, but Washington pressed the other NSG members to tacitly expand the trigger list by seeking prohibitions of specific dual-use exports bound for nuclear programs in such countries as Pakistan.
In this context, the NSG began meeting again and expanded its membership further. It also adopted full-scope safeguards, but years later granted India an exception that haunts the nonproliferation regime. With his focus on U. Moreover, Kissinger may have found writing about nonproliferation issues somewhat tricky.
He and President Richard Nixon had been dismissive of the NPT, but Kissinger changed course during and that would have to be explained. Moreover, nonproliferation policy during the s and s cannot be discussed without tackling sensitive questions such as the Israeli nuclear program and why Kissinger had acquiesced in it, in contrast to taking a more activist approach to check Pakistani nuclear plans during Perhaps, Kissinger concluded that this was one issue that resisted his strong interest in using memoirs and other writings to justify his record of diplomacy.
Digital National Security Archive. Before the Indian test, an interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing group, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem.
It had developed a trigger list of nuclear supplies that required IAEA safeguards but the list did not include reprocessing or enrichment technologies because NPT article III only covered supplies, not technology. Toward this end, the Under Secretaries Committee proposed “talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed.
One problem that the report brought up was that France did not belong to the Zangger Committee. After the Indian test, the agencies moved forward in developing an action plan on the nuclear supply problem and related issues which Henry Kissinger signed off on in NSDM Among other measures, Kissinger endorsed consultations with suppliers to establish “common principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment” and encouraging multinational frameworks for “enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing facilities.
Sharp asked Kissinger how the proliferation of nuclear technology could be prevented and what should be said to the Argentines and the Egyptians, who were also seeking to use nuclear energy. But Kissinger evidently had no answer. Kissinger Staff Meetings,box 4. Also encouraging interest in a close look at nuclear export policy were negotiations, pre-dating the Indian test, over nuclear reactor sales to Israel, Egypt, and Iran. Near the end of a discussion of non-proliferation policy with British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan [pages ], Kissinger realized he needed to tackle the problem of nuclear exports and asked his aide, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to arrange a staff meeting.
Executive Secretary George S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” Secret.
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Among the specific issues reviewed tasls the status of the NPT, export control issues, tasoa problem of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” the implications of the Indian test, annayasa long-term steps for controlling the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.
The authors saw a compelling security requirement: Creating a forum for nuclear exporters to develop common policies was a major recommendation, but the paper on controls over nuclear exports pointed to a significant problem: Strategy and Action Program” to help guide policy.
An important proposal was for “high level political approaches to key exporting countries to enlist their support for safeguarding transfers of nuclear materials. They would not want the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to erode their status as a nuclear power, nor would they favor the proliferation of enrichment capabilities that would undermine their own investments in enrichment facilities.
This was an “urgent matter.
While noting that the U. And if they have an overwhelming desire for preliminary bilateral talks with us, maybe we will do it. State Department telegram to U.
State Department release from P-reels; B: The Soviet Union was not yet a major nuclear exporter, but they had potential and as a major co-sponsor of the NPT had followed nonproliferation norms in their nuclear anayyasa. Washington could lessen this problem by assuring Moscow that the initial group would be the “nucleus” of a larger grouping that could include Yasla allies.
The proposed guidelines for nuclear exporters included no “peaceful nuclear explosives” for non-nuclear states, IAEA safeguards for nuclear supplies, and “special restraints” over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including anayasw safeguards and multinational plants. Moreover, for regions where nuclear exports could exacerbate instability and conflict, suppliers would agree to “stringent” conditions.
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On 17 Octoberthe State Department took the first step to bringing the Soviets in by sending a telegram about the project to the embassy in Moscow.
While no one could be sure whether the French would abandon their “case-by-case” approach to nuclear exports, the advisers believed that the French disliked nuclear proliferation and wished to remain the only nuclear weapons state in Western Europe. Moreover, their dependency on U. HEU for their civilian nuclear program might reinforce their interest in strengthening U.
By mid-Octoberthe French were giving signals that they were open to dialogue on export controls but the advisers believed that an approach to Paris was becoming more urgent in light of recent intelligence that Paris was signing contracts on nuclear export deals, probably a reference to Pakistan and South Korea.
Memorandum from Williams H. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would take place to go over the issues.
Consulate, Jerusalem, “Action Memorandum: Memorandum from George S. State Department releases anayada P-reels; E: While the French were generally receptive because they did not want to be “isolated,” they nevertheless wanted to chart their own course in developing nonproliferation policy. It took some wrangling over a variety of issues, including the five U. After French officials observed that what would emerge would “be the least common denominator,” Taala Department Politico-Military Affairs Director George Vest acknowledged that was “the nature of such activities.
Adding urgency to getting the French involved was growing U. If the French did not participate, neither would the West Germans. To ensure French involvement, Kissinger wrote Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues that he saw enough “common understanding” on important issues to provide a basis for French participation. He assured Sauvagnargues that he did not want any of the “major suppliers to be isolated” and that there was a need for consensus and” harmonization” on policy.
In reply the French foreign ansyasa asked for assurances and recognition that French concessions were the “limits of our possibilities. On 18 April, Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances, which he wrote up in a letter to Sauvagnargues not long before the suppliers met in London gasla 25 April. Kissinger shaped the future of the NSG by writing that agreements anaayasa be based on consensus, decisions would not be retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be “informal and confidential.
Memorandum from Thomas O. PPS, boxJune, C: State Department records of the April meeting in London have yet to surface in anyasa archives, but the gist of what happened can be parsed out from other documents.
So can the results of a follow-up meeting in mid-June A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle later known as “full-scope” safeguards. Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing tadla enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country. On these matters and others, the French position was central. Ahayasa on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting,” 15 September George Vest to Mr.
Memorandum of conversation, “Visit of Secretary of State and Mrs. Declassification release from AAD; C: Drawing on the declassified record, the editor has filled in many of the country names deleted by State Department reviewers from document A.
Washington had included the substance of full-scope safeguards in the original five-point paper but Kissinger would not go against the French and risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group.
A recently declassified telegram document 15B illuminates the U.
Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle i. Ottawa relented but an interesting and sometimes confused conversation between Talsa and Prime Minister Pierre-Elliot Trudeau suggested the latter was still interested in full-scope safeguards.
Kissinger might not have been sure what Trudeau meant: Trudeau highlighted an important problem: